伦理学——第三部分
- 语言:
- 英语
- 状态:
- 完整作品
- 作者归属:
- 作者本人所著
- 文本状况:
- 未检测到扫描噪点 (对全文的自动评估,未经人工核对)
- 篇幅:
- 约 23,200 词 · 110 个段落
引用本作品
- APA巴鲁赫·斯宾诺莎. (n.d.). Ethics — Part 3 [伦理学——第三部分]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/zh/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-3
- MLA巴鲁赫·斯宾诺莎. Ethics — Part 3 [伦理学——第三部分]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/zh/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-3.
- Chicago巴鲁赫·斯宾诺莎. Ethics — Part 3 [伦理学——第三部分]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/zh/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-3.
本条目引用所收录的版本。SigPhi 是数字复制平台。已知的年份、出版者和译者均列出;“n.d.”表示年份未知。
内容简介
一个完整的体系——神、心灵、情感、自由——像几何学一样加以证明:定义、公理、命题,最终归于一个思想:自由即是理解必然。
背景与流传
斯宾诺莎约于1675年完成《伦理学》,却放弃了生前出版:他的«神即自然»——神与自然是同一个东西——所引起的丑闻会把他埋葬。1677年,他去世数月后,此书作为《遗著集》的一部分问世,旋即被禁。作者生前在海牙以磨镜片为生,二十三岁时被阿姆斯特丹犹太社团革出教门,那道措辞极严的绝罚令从未撤销。整整一个世纪,«斯宾诺莎主义者»是一句骂人话;此后,对德国唯心论和更多后来者而言,它成了一座每种哲学都必须以之衡量自身的高山。
这是编辑性背景,不是可引用的来源:与作品本身的段落不同,这些说明无法在语料库中核对。
of its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many things being accomplished solely by the laws of nature, which they would never have believed possible except under the direction of mind: such are the actions performed by somnambulists while asleep, and wondered at by their performers when awake. I would further call attention to the mechanism of the human body, which far surpasses in complexity all that has been put together by human art, not to repeat what I have already shown, namely, that from nature, under whatever attribute she be considered, infinite results follow. As for the second objection, I submit that the world would be much happier, if men were as fully able to keep silence as they are to speak. Experience abundantly shows that men can govern anything more easily than their tongues, and restrain anything more easily than their appetites; when it comes about that many believe, that we are only free in respect to objects which we moderately desire, because our desire for such can easily be controlled by the thought of something else frequently remembered, but that we are by no means free in respect to what we seek with violent emotion, for our desire cannot then be allayed with the remembrance of anything else. However, unless such persons had proved by experience that we do many things which we afterwards repent of, and again that we often, when assailed by contrary emotions, see the better and follow the worse, there would be nothing to prevent their believing that we are free in all things. Thus an infant believes that of its own free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely desires to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe that they speak from the free decision of their…