创化论
- 语言:
- 英语
- 状态:
- 完整作品
- 作者归属:
- 作者本人所著
- 文本状况:
- 含扫描错误 (对全文的自动评估,未经人工核对) · 10 段无法辨读,已从回答中排除
- 篇幅:
- 约 180,000 词 · 844 个段落
引用本作品
- APA亨利·柏格森. (n.d.). Creative Evolution [创化论]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/zh/works/henri-bergson/creative-evolution
- MLA亨利·柏格森. Creative Evolution [创化论]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/zh/works/henri-bergson/creative-evolution.
- Chicago亨利·柏格森. Creative Evolution [创化论]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/zh/works/henri-bergson/creative-evolution.
这是 SigPhi 所复制版本的引用:SigPhi 是其数字复制品,不是出版者。元数据中没有版本年份(因此写作“n.d.”),译者只有在有记录时才列出。
内容简介
柏格森的主张:演化既不能用偶然解释,也不能用预定的蓝图解释,而要用一种冲动——“生命冲力”——来解释;它不断尝试路径,并向彼此分歧的方向分流。
背景与流传
一九〇七年出版,此书在哲学界之外获得了极大成功,使他成为名人;一九二七年他获颁诺贝尔文学奖。经受住时间考验的并非“生命冲力”——生物学从未接受它——而是他对“理智如何制造时间”的批判:柏格森主张,思维本是为行动而生的,它把绵延化为一连串静止的瞬间,因而无法思考正在变化的东西。
这是编辑性背景,不是可引用的来源:与作品本身的段落不同,这些说明无法在语料库中核对。
From this survival of the past it follows that consciousness cannot go through the same state twice. The circumstances may still be the same, but they will act no longer on the same person, since they find him at a new moment of his history. Our personality, which is being built up each instant with its accumulated experience, changes without ceasing. By changing, it prevents any state, although superficially identical with another, from ever repeating it in its very depth. That is why our duration is irreversible. We could not live over again a single moment, for we should have to begin by effacing the memory of all that had followed. Even could we erase this memory from our intellect, we could not from our will. Thus our personality shoots, grows and ripens without ceasing. Each of its moments is something new added to what was before. We may go further: it is not only something new, but something unforeseeable. Doubtless, my present state is explained by what was in me and by what was acting on me a moment ago. In analyzing it I should find no other elements. But even a superhuman intelligence would not have been able to foresee the simple indivisible form which gives to these purely abstract elements their concrete organization. For to foresee consists of projecting into the future what has been perceived in the past, or of imagining for a later time a new grouping, in a new order, of elements already perceived. But that which has never been perceived, and which is at the same time simple, is necessarily unforeseeable. Now such is the case with each of our states, regarded as a moment in a history that is gradually unfolding: it is simple, and it cannot have been already perceived, since it concentrates in its indivisibility all that has been perceived and what the present is adding to it besides. It is an original moment of a no less original history.