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认识论

约翰·费希特

语言:
英语
状态:
完整作品
作者归属:
作者本人所著
文本状况:
未检测到扫描噪点 (对全文的自动评估,未经人工核对)
篇幅:
约 110,000 词 · 525 个段落
引用本作品
  • APA约翰·费希特. (n.d.). The science of knowledge y J.G. Fichte. Tr. from the German A.E. Kroeger [认识论]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/zh/works/johann-fichte/the-science-of-knowledge-y-j-g-fichte-tr-from-the-german-a-e-kroeger
  • MLA约翰·费希特. The science of knowledge y J.G. Fichte. Tr. from the German A.E. Kroeger [认识论]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/zh/works/johann-fichte/the-science-of-knowledge-y-j-g-fichte-tr-from-the-german-a-e-kroeger.
  • Chicago约翰·费希特. The science of knowledge y J.G. Fichte. Tr. from the German A.E. Kroeger [认识论]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/zh/works/johann-fichte/the-science-of-knowledge-y-j-g-fichte-tr-from-the-german-a-e-kroeger.

这是 SigPhi 所复制版本的引用:SigPhi 是其数字复制品,不是出版者。元数据中没有版本年份(因此写作“n.d.”),译者只有在有记录时才列出。

内容简介

费希特一七九四年的《知识学》:这是把康德的整套哲学从一个单一原理重建起来的头一次尝试。

背景与流传

英文书名略易生误会:“Wissenschaftslehre”意谓“关于科学的学说”,指的是一切知识的根基,而非自然科学的哲学。费希特从康德出发,认为康德未竟其事:既然“物自体”不可知,那就无须设定它。他的出发点是“自我设定自我”的那个行动;由此,经由对置与限定,推出“非我”以及其余的一切。这是现存最难读的文本之一;费希特一再重写,始终不满意。若无此书,谢林与黑格尔都无从索解。克罗格的译本出于十九世纪,所对应的是第一稿,而非后来的各稿。

这是编辑性背景,不是可引用的来源:与作品本身的段落不同,这些说明无法在语料库中核对。

开篇
At this point in history begins the German movement inaugurated by Kant. German philosophy has the task of exploring the subjective field exhaustively. Sceptic ism had explored it partially. Kant and Fichte com plete this subjective inventory of facts and processes of consciousness ; Schelling and Hegel compare the results with those of the old philosophy based on Greek ontology and demonstrate their substantial identity. The net outcome is the same in both. Psychology presupposes an absolute ego identical with Aristotle's purely active reason. (Scholasticism understood this actus purus to be God.) In Fichte's system we may see all the steps of de monstrating this astonishing result Moreover, we may see iu his various works all the stages of a consciousness awakening to realize the true significance of the con sequences that he derived from his own philosophy. This is a strange phenomenon in the history of philosophy. We are surprised to see a philosopher unconscious of the consequences of his own system. Kant was vividly conscious of his deductions, but he was not aware that there was a second series of deduc tions to be made from his system. Fichte discovered this second series, and united into one whole the critique of Pure Reason, and the critique of Practical Reason. He showed how the fundamental principle oi conscious- 3C PREFACE. 3C PREFACE. ness—" the ego is the ego " — unfolded into two principles, one of which is theoretical and leads to the "Pure Reason," while the other is a principle of the will, or a practical reason." But this second series (Fichte's) of deductions or consequences from the first series (Kant's) gave rise to a third series of deductions or consequences ; namely, a series of inferences as to the Absolute Ego or First Prin ciple presupposed by the Science of Knowledge. Fichte gradually became conscious of this third series of deduc tions, making continual progress as long as he lived.

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