Tractat sobre la naturalesa humana
- Idioma:
- anglès
- Completesa:
- Obra completa
- Autoria:
- Escrita per l'autor
- Estat del text:
- Sense soroll d'escaneig detectat (mesura automàtica sobre tot el text, no revisada a mà)
- Extensió:
- ~240.000 paraules · 1.130 passatges
Cita aquesta obra
- APADavid Hume. (n.d.). A Treatise of Human Nature [Tractat sobre la naturalesa humana]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/david-hume/a-treatise-of-human-nature
- MLADavid Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature [Tractat sobre la naturalesa humana]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/david-hume/a-treatise-of-human-nature.
- ChicagoDavid Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature [Tractat sobre la naturalesa humana]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ca/works/david-hume/a-treatise-of-human-nature.
Referència de l’edició reproduïda. SigPhi és la reproducció digital, no l’editor. S’hi inclouen l’any, l’editorial i el traductor quan consten; «n.d.» indica que no consta l’any. La responsabilitat d’un pròleg o d’una nota es determina segons el passatge citat.
De què tracta
El primer llibre de Hume i el més radical: l'origen de les idees en les impressions, la crítica de la causalitat, la negació d'un jo substancial i la tesi que la raó és esclava de les passions.
Context i història
El va publicar entre el 1739 i el 1740, tenint poc més de vint anys, i no el va llegir gairebé ningú: ell mateix va escriure que va «caure mort de la premsa». Va reescriure'n les parts en les Investigacions, més curtes i més amables, i de gran va demanar expressament que es prengués aquelles com la seva posició i no el Tractat. La posteritat no li ha fet cas, i el Tractat és el llibre que se li llegeix.
Context editorial, no una font citable: a diferència dels passatges de l'obra, aquestes dades no es poden contrastar amb el corpus.
Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important questions, that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them. It is easy for one of judgment and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself. Nor is there required such profound knowledge to discover the present imperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doors may, judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle it is not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours.…