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Hasard, amour et logique : essais philosophiques

Charles Peirce

Langue:
anglais
État:
Œuvre complète
Paternité:
Écrite par l'auteur
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Aucun bruit de numérisation détecté (mesure automatique sur tout le texte, non vérifiée à la main)
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~92 800 mots · 441 passages
Citer cette œuvre
  • APACharles Peirce. (n.d.). Chance, Love, and Logic Philosophical Essays [Hasard, amour et logique : essais philosophiques]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/fr/works/charles-peirce/chance-love-and-logic-philosophical-essays
  • MLACharles Peirce. Chance, Love, and Logic Philosophical Essays [Hasard, amour et logique : essais philosophiques]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/fr/works/charles-peirce/chance-love-and-logic-philosophical-essays.
  • ChicagoCharles Peirce. Chance, Love, and Logic Philosophical Essays [Hasard, amour et logique : essais philosophiques]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/fr/works/charles-peirce/chance-love-and-logic-philosophical-essays.

Référence de l’édition reproduite. SigPhi est la reproduction numérique. Année, éditeur et traducteur sont indiqués lorsqu’ils sont connus ; « n.d. » signale une année inconnue.

De quoi il s'agit

Chance, Love and Logic : essais philosophiques.

Contexte et histoire

Le recueil posthume (1923) qui a mis Peirce à la portée d'un public. On y trouve « The Fixation of Belief » et « How to Make Our Ideas Clear », les deux articles où naît le pragmatisme, et les essais cosmologiques sur le hasard comme trait réel de l'univers. Peirce a peu publié de son vivant et est mort pauvre ; la reconnaissance est venue après.

Contexte éditorial, non une source citable : contrairement aux passages de l'œuvre, ces données ne peuvent pas être vérifiées dans le corpus.

Extrait de l’édition disponible
regarding matters in different lights, gradually develop beliefs in harmony with natural causes. This method resembles that by which conceptions of art have been brought to maturity. The most perfect example of it is to be found in the history of metaphysical philosophy. Systems of this sort have not usually rested upon observed facts, at least not in any great degree. They have been chiefly adopted because their fundamental propositions seemed “agreeable to reason.” This is an apt expression; it does not mean that which agrees with experience, but that which we find ourselves inclined to believe. Plato, for example, finds it agreeable to reason that the distances of the celestial spheres from one another should be proportional to the different lengths of strings which produce harmonious chords. Many philosophers have been led to their main conclusions by considerations like this; but this is the lowest and least developed form which the method takes, for it is clear that another man might find Kepler’s [earlier] theory, that the celestial spheres are proportional to the inscribed and circumscribed spheres of the different regular solids, more agreeable to _his_ reason. But the shock of opinions will soon lead men to rest on preferences of a far more universal nature. Take, for example, the doctrine that man only acts selfishly—that is, from the consideration that acting in one way will afford him more pleasure than acting in another. This rests on no fact in the world, but it has had a wide acceptance as being the only reasonable theory. This method is far more intellectual and respectable from the point of view of reason than either of the others which we have noticed. But its failure has been the most manifest.…

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