Les phénomènes de l'univers, ou histoire naturelle pour l'édification de la philosophie

But the chemists and the whole pack of mechanics and empirics, should they have the temerity to attempt contemplation and philosophy, being accustomed to meticulous subtlety in a few things, they twist by extraordinary means all the rest into conformity with them and promote opinions more odious and unnatural than those advanced by the very rationalists. For the latter take for the matter of philosophy very little out of many things, the former a great deal out of a few, but in truth those courses are weak and past cure. But the Natural History which has been accumulated hitherto may seem abundant on casual inspection, while in reality it is sketchy and useless, and not even of the kind I am seeking. For it has not been stripped of fables and ravings, and it rushes into antiquity, philology and superfluous narratives, neglectful and high-handed in matters of weight, overscrupulous and immoderate in matters of no importance. But the worst thing about this abundance is that it has embraced the inquiry into things natural but largely spurned that into things mechanical. Now the latter are far better than the former for examining nature's recesses; for nature of its own accord, free and shifting, disperses the intellect and confuses it with its variety, but in mechanical operations the judgment is concentrated, and we see nature's modes and processes, not just its effects. Yet, on the other hand, all the subtlety of mechanics stops short of what I am seeking. For the craftsman, intent on his work and its end, does not direct his mind or put his hand to other things, things which perhaps do more for the inquiry into nature.