エチカ——第3部
- 言語:
- 英語
- 状態:
- 完全な作品
- 著者性:
- 著者自身による
- テキストの状態:
- スキャンのノイズは検出されていません (全文に対する自動測定で、人の目では確認していません)
- 分量:
- 約 23,200 語 · 110 節
この作品を引用
- APAバールーフ・デ・スピノザ. (n.d.). Ethics — Part 3 [エチカ——第3部]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ja/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-3
- MLAバールーフ・デ・スピノザ. Ethics — Part 3 [エチカ——第3部]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/ja/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-3.
- Chicagoバールーフ・デ・スピノザ. Ethics — Part 3 [エチカ——第3部]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ja/works/baruch-spinoza/ethics-part-3.
収録版の書誌情報です。SigPhi はデジタル複製です。判明している刊行年・出版社・翻訳者を記載し、年が不明の場合は「n.d.」と示します。
何についての本か
神、精神、感情、自由——完全な体系を幾何学のように論証する。定義、公理、定理が積み重なり、「自由とは必然を理解することである」という思想へ至る。
背景と歴史
スピノザは1675年ごろ『エチカ』を完成させたが、生前の出版は断念した。「神即自然」——神と自然は同一のものである——のスキャンダルは、彼を葬り去っていただろう。書は1677年、死の数か月後に『遺稿集』の一部として世に出て、ほとんど即座に禁書となった。著者はハーグでレンズを磨いて暮らした人であり、二十三歳でアムステルダムのユダヤ人共同体から破門されていた。その破門状の苛烈さは、ついに取り消されることがなかった。一世紀のあいだ「スピノザ主義者」は罵倒の言葉だった。のちにドイツ観念論をはじめ多くの者にとって、あらゆる哲学が己を測るべき山となった。
これは編集上の背景であり、引用できる典拠ではありません。作品本文の一節とは異なり、これらの記述はコーパスで検証できません。
of its sole nature, whereas they have experience of many things being accomplished solely by the laws of nature, which they would never have believed possible except under the direction of mind: such are the actions performed by somnambulists while asleep, and wondered at by their performers when awake. I would further call attention to the mechanism of the human body, which far surpasses in complexity all that has been put together by human art, not to repeat what I have already shown, namely, that from nature, under whatever attribute she be considered, infinite results follow. As for the second objection, I submit that the world would be much happier, if men were as fully able to keep silence as they are to speak. Experience abundantly shows that men can govern anything more easily than their tongues, and restrain anything more easily than their appetites; when it comes about that many believe, that we are only free in respect to objects which we moderately desire, because our desire for such can easily be controlled by the thought of something else frequently remembered, but that we are by no means free in respect to what we seek with violent emotion, for our desire cannot then be allayed with the remembrance of anything else. However, unless such persons had proved by experience that we do many things which we afterwards repent of, and again that we often, when assailed by contrary emotions, see the better and follow the worse, there would be nothing to prevent their believing that we are free in all things. Thus an infant believes that of its own free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely desires to run away; further, a drunken man believes that he utters from the free decision of his mind words which, when he is sober, he would willingly have withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and others of like complexion, believe that they speak from the free decision of their…