崇高と美の観念の起原
- 言語:
- 英語
- 状態:
- 完全な作品
- 著者性:
- 著者自身による
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- スキャンのノイズは検出されていません (全文に対する自動測定で、人の目では確認していません)
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- 約 57,100 語 · 271 節
この作品を引用
- APAエドマンド・バーク. (n.d.). A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful [崇高と美の観念の起原]. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ja/works/edmund-burke/a-philosophical-enquiry-into-the-origin-of-our-ideas-of-the-sublime-and-beautiful
- MLAエドマンド・バーク. A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful [崇高と美の観念の起原]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/ja/works/edmund-burke/a-philosophical-enquiry-into-the-origin-of-our-ideas-of-the-sublime-and-beautiful.
- Chicagoエドマンド・バーク. A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful [崇高と美の観念の起原]. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/ja/works/edmund-burke/a-philosophical-enquiry-into-the-origin-of-our-ideas-of-the-sublime-and-beautiful.
収録版の書誌情報です。SigPhi はデジタル複製です。判明している刊行年・出版社・翻訳者を記載し、年が不明の場合は「n.d.」と示します。
何についての本か
『崇高と美の観念の起源についての哲学的探究』（一七五七年）。二十七歳のバークが美学をやっている。
背景と歴史
美しいもの——小さく、なめらかで、心地よいもの——と、崇高なもの——巨大で、暗く、恐ろしく、それゆえいっそう人を動かすもの——を分ける。この区別はカントに、ロマン主義の全体に、そして恐怖が快であることをめぐるその後のすべてに刻印を残した。
これは編集上の背景であり、引用できる典拠ではありません。作品本文の一節とは異なり、これらの記述はコーパスで検証できません。
from the reſemblance, which the imitation has to the original; the imagination, I conceive, can have no pleaſure but what reſults from one or the other of theſe cauſes. And theſe cauſes operate pretty uniformly upon all men, becauſe they operate by principles in nature, and which are not derived from any particular habits or advantages. Mr. Locke very juſtly and finely obſerves of wit, that it is chiefly converſant in tracing reſemblances; he remarks at the ſame time, that the buſi-G - neſs neſs of judgment is rather in finding differences. It may perhaps appear, on this ſuppoſition, that there is no material diſtinction between the wit and the judgment, as they both ſeem to, reſult from different operations of the ſame faculty of comparing. But in reality, whether they are or are not dependent on the ſame power of the mind, they differ fo very materially in many reſpects, that a perfect union of wit and judgment is one of the rareſt things in the world. When two diftin& objects are unlike to each other, it is only what we expect; things are in their common way ; and therefore they make no impreſſion on the imagination: but when two diſtinct objects have a reſemblance, we are ſtruck, we attend to them, and we are pleaſed. The mind of man has naturally a far greater alacrity and ſatisfaction in tracing reſemblances than in ſearching for differences; becauſe by making reſemblances we produce neu images, we' unite, we create, we enlarge our ON TASTE. 19