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A Treatise of Human Nature

David Hume

Sprache:
Englisch
Status:
Vollständiges Werk
Autorschaft:
Vom Autor verfasst
Zustand des Textes:
Kein Scanrauschen festgestellt (automatische Messung über den ganzen Text, nicht von Hand geprüft)
Umfang:
~240.000 Wörter · 1.130 Passagen
Dieses Werk zitieren
  • APADavid Hume. (n.d.). A Treatise of Human Nature. Digital reproduction: SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/de/works/david-hume/a-treatise-of-human-nature
  • MLADavid Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature. Digital reproduction, SigPhi, https://sigphiai.com/de/works/david-hume/a-treatise-of-human-nature.
  • ChicagoDavid Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature. Digital reproduction, SigPhi. https://sigphiai.com/de/works/david-hume/a-treatise-of-human-nature.

Nachweis der wiedergegebenen Ausgabe. SigPhi ist die digitale Reproduktion. Jahr, Verlag und Übersetzer werden angegeben, soweit bekannt; „n.d.“ bedeutet unbekanntes Jahr.

Wovon es handelt

Humes erstes und radikalstes Buch: die Herkunft der Ideen aus den Eindrücken, die Kritik der Verursachung, die Leugnung eines substanziellen Ich und die These, die Vernunft sei Sklavin der Leidenschaften.

Kontext und Geschichte

Er veröffentlichte es 1739/40, kaum über zwanzig, und fast niemand las es: Er selbst schrieb, es sei „totgeboren aus der Presse gefallen“. Er arbeitete seine Teile zu den kürzeren, gefälligeren Untersuchungen um und bat im Alter ausdrücklich, diese und nicht den Traktat als seine Position zu nehmen. Die Nachwelt hat sich nicht daran gehalten; gelesen wird er für den Traktat.

Redaktioneller Kontext, keine zitierfähige Quelle: anders als die Passagen des Werks lassen sich diese Angaben nicht am Korpus überprüfen.

Auszug aus der verfügbaren Ausgabe
Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content with lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important questions, that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them. It is easy for one of judgment and learning, to perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself. Nor is there required such profound knowledge to discover the present imperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doors may, judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle it is not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours.…

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